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The concept of ‘irreversibility’ plays a large role in many domains, including public health, medi-
cal practice and environmental protection. Indeed, the concept is explicit in some statements of the
precautionary principle. But the idea of irreversibility remains poorly defined. Because of the flow
of time, any loss is, in a sense, irreversible. On one approach, irreversibility might be understood
as a reference to the value associated with taking precautionary steps that maintain flexibility for an
uncertain future (‘option value’). On another approach, irreversibility might be understood to refer
to the qualitatively distinctive and even unique nature of certain losses—a point that raises a claim
about incommensurability. The two conceptions fit different problems. These ideas can be applied
to a wide assortment of environmental and public health questions, including overuse of antibiotics,
genetic modification of food, avian flu and climate change.
Keywords: irreversibility; precautionary principle; uncertainty; option value; incommensurability.
1. Introduction
Many social problems have an element of irreversibility. If a species is lost, it is probably lost for-
ever; the same might well be true of pristine areas. Genetically modified organisms might lead to
irreversible ecological harm; transgenic crops can impose irreversible losses by increasing pest resis-
tance.1 Concerns about irreversibility are raised by the resistance-increasing overuse of antibiotics,
the uncertain hazards of human germline modifications and the alleged threat to human nature of
various biological enhancements. In the context of public health and environmental protection, irre-
versibility is a pervasive concern; risks are frequently uncertain, and if precautionary steps are not
taken, a loss might plausibly be characterized as irreversible. In recent decades, the problem of cli-
mate change has raised the most serious concerns about irreversibility. Some greenhouse gases stay
  This essay was completed before the author began work in the Obama Administration, first as a Senior Adviser to the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and later as Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs. Nothing said here represents an official position in any way of the United States government.
† Email: csunstei@law.harvard.edu
1 See generally, Benoit Morel et al., Pesticide Resistance, the Precautionary Principle, and the Regulation of Bt Corn:
Real Option and Rational Option Approaches to Decisionmaking, in Battling Resistance to Antibiotics and Pesticides 184
(Ramanan Laxminarayan ed.) (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 2003) (proposing option theory as an analytical
framework for the precautionary principle and applying that framework to the issue of commercializing Bt corn); Justus
Wesseler, Resistance Economics of Transgenic Crops under Uncertainty: A Real Options Approach, in ibid at 214 (discussing
pest resistance as an irreversible cost of transgenic crops).
c   The Author [2010]. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
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 228 C. R. SUNSTEIN
in the atmosphere for centuries, and for that reason climate change threatens to be irreversible, at
least for all practical purposes.2
The risk of irreversibility is especially troublesome in light of massive uncertainty about the
actualdamagefromclimatechange. Supposethatweproject, withtheInternationalPanel onClimate
Change, warming between 1.8 and 4.0 C by 2100.3 There is a large difference between adverse
effects at 1.8 C and adverse effects at 4.0 C.4 Even at a specified increase in temperature, it is
exceedingly difficult to know the extent of the harm.5 If the average global temperature increases
by 3.0 C one hundred years from now, the extent of the greatly damage is disputed, in part because
of uncertainty about the possibility of adaptation, in part because of uncertainty about the resulting
effects on global conditions. There is some risk of catastrophe, and once that risk is incorporated
into the analysis, the assessment of what to do changes dramatically.6 Aggressive measures, in the
form of emissions reductions or adaptation, might be justified in order to maintain flexibility in the
event that either warming or actual damage turns out to be at the higher end of the range.
The problem of climate change should be taken as merely exemplary. Many public health prob-
lems, including those involving use of antibiotics and contagious diseases, involve probabilistic
harms and an apparent danger of irreversibility. It is tempting to think that even if a harm is merely
speculative, it makes sense to take aggressive precautionary measures, on the intuitive ground that
an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.
Concerned about the problem of irreversibility, sensible nations might consider adopting a dis-
tinctive(ifadmittedlyvague)principleforhandlingcertainrisks:theIrreversibleHarmPrecautionary
Principle.7 Indeed, some such principle seems to underlie prominent accounts of the precautionary
principle, which point explicitly to the problem of irreversibility. For example, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change proclaims: ‘Where there are threats of serious or ir-
reversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing
[regulatory] measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change
should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost’.8 Similarly, the
1992 Rio Declaration states, ‘Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation’.9
InAmericanlaw,relatedideasareatworkinthedomainsofpublichealthandenvironmentalpro-
tection. San Francisco has adopted its own precautionary principle, with an emphasis on irreversibil-
ity: ‘Where threats of serious or irreversible damage to people or nature exist, lack of full scientific
certainty about cause and effect shall not be viewed as sufficient reason for the City to postpone
2 See W. David Montgomery and Anne E. Smith, Global Climate Change and the Precautionary Principle, 6 Hum. Ecol.
Risk Assess. 399, 400 (2000).
3 See William Nordhaus, A Question of Balance (2008).
4 See ibid; Sudden and Disruptive Climate Change (Michael C. MacCracken et al. eds., 2007).
5 For a variety of accounts, see ibid; for a helpful overview, see Daniel Farber, Climate Models: A Users’ Guide (2007),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1030607.
6 See Martin Weitzman, Structural Uncertainty and the Value of Statistical Life in the Economics of Catastrophic Climate
Change (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1021968.
7 See Scott Farrow, Using Risk-Assessment, Benefit-Cost Analysis, and Real Options to Implement a Precautionary Prin-
ciple, 24 Risk Anal. 727, 728 (2004).
8 See Indur Goklany, The Precautionary Principle: A Critical Appraisal of Environmental Risk Assessment 6 (Washington,
DC: Cato Institute, 2001).
9 Quoted in Bjorn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist 347 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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 IRREVERSIBILITY 229
cost effective measures to prevent the degradation of the environment or protect the health of its
citizens’.10 At the federal level, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires agencies to
discuss ‘any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the
proposed action should it be implemented’.11 Courts have been careful to insist that environmental
impact statements should be prepared at a time that permits consideration of environmental effects
before irretrievable commitments have been made.12 A number of other federal statutes, especially
in the context of public health and the environment, specifically refer to irreversible losses and make
their prevention a high priority.13 Within the federal courts, a special precautionary principle un-
derlies the analysis of preliminary injunctions in cases involving a risk of irreparable environmental
harm.14
For those who emphasize irreversibility, the general attitude in the face of uncertainty is ‘act,
then learn’, as opposed to the tempting and often sensible alternative of ‘wait and learn’. For many
public health problems, including those involving contagious diseases, some people believe that re-
search should be our first line of defense. In the context of climate change, it is sometimes suggested
that nations should refuse to commit substantial resources to reducing greenhouse gas emissions or
to adaptation until evidence of serious harm is clearer than it now us.15 To be sure, this view seems
to have fewer adherents every year.16 But some people believe that our initial steps should be rela-
tively cautious, increasing in aggressiveness as knowledge accumulates (and the costs of emissions
reductions fall).17 In this domain, however, there is a problem with any approach of ‘wait and learn’.
If precautionary steps are not taken immediately, the results may be irreversible or at best difficult
and expensive to reverse. For climate change, it might be best to take precautions now as a way of
preserving flexibility for future generations.18
My goal in this Essay is to explore the idea of irreversibility in public health and environmental
protection. In one sense, the idea seems unhelpful: all losses are irreversible, simply because of the
march of time. If Jones plays tennis this afternoon, rather than working, the relevant time is lost
10 See San Francisco Precautionary Principle Ordinance, available at http://temp.sfgov.org/sfenvironment/aboutus/
innovative/pp/sfpp.htm.
11 42 USC 102 (c)(5).
12 See Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F3d 1135 (9th Cir 2000); Scientists Inst. For Public Info v. AEC, 481 F2d 1079 (DC Cir 1973);
Sierra Club v. Marsh, 976 F2d 763 (1st Cir 1985).
13 See, e.g. 33 USC 2712(j) (making special exception to planning requirement for use of federal resources in a situation
requiring action to ‘avoid irreversible loss of natural resources’); 42 USC 9611 (i) (same exception for Superfund cleanups);
22 USC 2151p-1 (c)(2)(A) (requiring President to assist developing countries in a way that responds to ‘the irreversible losses
associated with forest destruction’).
14 See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F2 497 (1st Cir 1989); on the complexities here, see below.
15 See, e.g. Robert Mendelsohn, Perspective Paper 1.1, in Global Crises, Global Solutions 44, 47 (Bjørn Lomborg ed.)
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Wilfred Beckerman, Small is Stupid 102–103 (London: Duckworth, 1995).
The cautious approach of the Bush Administration can be understood in this light. See Global Climate Change Pol-
icy Book (February 2002), available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/climatechange.html; Chuck Hagel and
Frank Murkowski, High Costs of Kyoto, Wash. Post, January 29, 2000, at A17. A number of years ago, Nordhaus and Boyer
found that extremely little is lost by a 10-year delay in emissions reductions. See William D. Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer,
Warming the World: Economic Models of Global Warming 127 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000) (describing the net
loss as ‘trivially small’). For a technical discussion, see Alistair Ulph and David Ulph, Global Warming, Irreversibility and
Learning, 107 Econ. J. 636 (1997).
16 See Nordhaus, supra note; Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change (2007).
17 See Nordhaus, supra note; William Nordhaus, A Review of the Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change
(2007), available at http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/recent stuff.html.
18 See Graciela Chichilnisky and Geoffrey Heal, Global Environmental Risks, 7 J. Econ. Persp. 65, 80 (1993).
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 230 C. R. SUNSTEIN
forever. If a project to drill oil in Alaska is delayed for 5 years, there is an irreversible loss as well:
the oil that might have been made available will not be made available when it otherwise would have
been. When people emphasize the importance of irreversibility, I suggest that they are best taken as
having two separate conceptions in mind.
The first is connected with the idea of option value and in particular with the suggestion that
when information is missing, it is worthwhile to spend resources to maintain future flexibility as
knowledge increases. Irreversibility, in this sense, comes in various shapes and sizes, and it needs
to be taken into account in a sensible cost–benefit analysis. In the context of public health, this
kind of irreversibility is important to consider. A key point here is that many important problems
typically involve not irreversibility but irreversibilities: expenditures on public health problems may
turn out to be irreversible as well, and hence, it is necessary to know something about the nature
and magnitude of the irreversibilities on both sides. In many contexts, however, an understanding of
irreversibility will justify more aggressive precautions than would be indicated if the damage were
reversible.
The second conception, drawn from influential critiques of utilitarianism in general, emphasizes
losses of goods that are incommensurable, not in the sense that they are infinitely valuable, but in the
sense that they are qualitatively distinctive and in some cases unique. One idea here is that certain
amenities—like a friendship, a photograph album, an aspect of culture or a historic site—are not
fungible with their monetary equivalent. To the extent that they are lost, something unique is lost.
It is not replaceable. When people fear or deplore certain losses, this kind of irreversibility is often
their animating concern.
Economists and economic analysts of law often find this idea puzzling and opaque, in part be-
cause it is outside the scope of neoclassical (or behavioural) economics, and because it does not offer
any guidance for how to assess the costs and benefits of social harms. While the first conception calls
for a kind of ‘irreversibility premium’, embodied in a willingness to spend more on precautions or
preparation, the second does not suggest any particular approach. It does, however, insists on a cer-
tain way of thinking about many problems, and I suggest that economic analysts will be unable to
understand important debates, in politics, in law and in ethics, unless they have a sympathetic appre-
ciation of the second conception of irreversibility. Indeed, I suggest that economic analysis of some
public health and environmental problems is, in an important sense, obtuse, if it fails to appreciate
the animating concern.
2. Uses, options and irreversibility
2.1 Existence value, option value
Let us begin with the monetary valuation of a social good, such as a pristine area. Some people will
be willing to pay to use the area; they may visit it on a regular basis, and they might be very upset
at its loss. But others will be willing to pay to preserve it, even if they will not use it. In fact many
citizens would be happy to give some money to save a pristine area, perhaps especially if animals
can be found there. Hence, ‘existence value’ is sometimes included in the valuation of environmental
goods,19 and indeed, federal courts have insisted that agencies pay attention to that value in assessing
19 See David A. Dana, Existence Value and Federal Preservation Regulation, 28 Harvard Environ. Law Rev. 343, 345
(2004); Charles J. Cicchetti and Louis J. Wilde, Uniqueness, Irreversibility, and the Theory of Nonuse Values, 1111 Am. J.
Agric. Econ. 1121, 1121–1122 (1992).
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 IRREVERSIBILITY 231
damages to natural resources.20 Taken a group, citizens of many nations would be willing to pay a
great deal to preserve an endangered species or to maintain the existence of a remote island and its
ecosystem. In fact valuation of the damage from climate change must pay attention to the loss of
species and animals if only because human beings care about them.21
Butsomepeoplearealsowillingtopayforthe‘option’touseortobenefitfromanenvironmental
amenity in the future, even if they are unsure whether they will exercise that option at any time.22
Suppose that a pristine area might be developed in a way that ensures its permanent loss. Many
people would be willing to pay a significant amount to preserve their option to visit that area. Under
federal law, option value must also be considered in the assessment of natural resource damages.23
Many regulations pay attention to option value in the environmental context.24 In the domain of
publichealth,theimportanceofoptionvalueshouldbeclear.Fornumerousgoods,peoplearewilling
to pay and to do a great deal in order to ensure that their options are preserved.
Here, then, is a simple sense in which irreversible harm causes a loss that should be considered
and that must be included in measures of value. Some skeptics contend that it ‘is hard to imagine a
price for an irreversible loss’,25 but people certainly do identify prices for such losses or at least for
the risk of such losses.26 Whether or not we turn that value into some sort of monetary equivalent,
or deem willingness to pay to be determinative, it ought to matter.
The idea of option value, as used in the monetary valuation literature just discussed, is closely
related to the use of the notion of ‘options’ in the domain that I shall be emphasizing here. The
simpleclaimisthatwhenregulatorsaredealingwithanirreversibleloss,andwhentheyareuncertain
about the timing, magnitude and likelihood of that loss, they should be willing to pay a sum—the
option value—in order to maintain flexibility for the future. The option might not be exercised if
it turns out that the loss is not a serious one. But if the option is purchased, regulators will be in a
position to forestall that loss if it turns out to be large. The concern about irreversibility, and hence
an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle, are based on the idea that regulators should be willing
to buy an option to maintain their own flexibility. (I am using terms that suggest monetary payments,
but the basic point holds even if we are skeptical about the use of monetary equivalents; ‘purchases’
can take the form of precautionary steps that do not directly involve money.)
In the domain of finance, options take multiple forms.27 An investor might be willing to purchase
land that is known to have deposits of gold. Even if the cost of extraction is too high to justify mining,
ownership of the land creates an option to mine if the cost falls.28 A standard ‘call option’ is a right to
20 See Ohio v. U.S. Department of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 464 (DC Cir 1989).
21 See Wayne Hsiung and Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Animals, 155 U Pa L Rev 1695 (2007).
22 Cicchetti and Wilde, supra note, at 1122 (noting Weisbrod’s analogy of such amenities to public goods, in that ‘individ-
uals who may never purchase the commodity still hold a value for the option to do so’). The independent use of option value
is, however, challenged in various places. See, e.g. A. Myrick Freeman III, The Measurement of Environmental and Resource
Values 249–51 (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 2003) (suggesting that ‘what has been called an option value is
really just the algebraic difference between the expected values of two different points on a WTP [willingness to pay] locus’).
23 See Ohio v. U.S. Department of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 464 (DC Cir 1989).
24 See, e.g. 60 Fed. Reg. 29914 (1995); 60 Fed. Reg. 28210. 29,914, 29,928 (1995); 59 Fed. Reg. 1062, 1078 (1994). But
see 69 Fed. Reg. 68,444 (2004) (doubting whether option value should be recognized as separate from others values).
25 See Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing 185
(New York: New Press, 2004).
26 For a helpful overview, see Richard C. Bishop, Option Value: An Exposition and Extension, 58 Land Econ. 1 (1982).
27 See Tom Copeland and Vladimir Antikarocov, Real Option 8–13 (2001).
28 See Richard Brealey and Stewart Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 565 (2002).
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 232 C. R. SUNSTEIN
purchase an asset prior to a specific date at a specified price.29 (People might pay for the right to buy
a share of stock in their favorite company at $50, 6 months from now.) In another variation, people
might seek the right to abandon a project at a fixed price, perhaps on the occurrence of a specified
worst-case scenario. (People might agree to perform some service for someone but obtain the right
not to perform in the event of bad weather, bad health or some other contingency.) Alternatively,
people might obtain the right to scale back a project, to expand it, or to extend its life. In another
variation, people might seek the right to abandon a project at a fixed price, perhaps on the occurrence
ofaspecifiedsetofevents.Alternatively,theymightobtaintherighttoscalebackaproject,toexpand
it or to extend its life. Options that recognize multiple sources of uncertainty, of the sort that can be
found for many public health problems, are termed ‘rainbow options’.30
Option theory has countless applications outside of the domain of investments. People would
be willing to do and possibly even to spend a great deal to preserve their option to have another
child—even if they are not at all sure that they really want to have another child. Or consider narrow
judicial rulings, of the sort celebrated by judicial minimalists,31 who want courts to make decisions
that are focused on particular details and that leave many questions undecided. Narrow rulings can
be understood as a way of ‘buying’ an option or at least of ‘paying’ a certain amount by imposing
decision-making burdens on others, in return for future flexibility. Judges who leave things unde-
cided, and who focus their rulings on the facts of particular cases, are in a sense forcing themselves,
and society as a whole, to purchase an option to pay for flexibility in the resolution of subsequent
problems. Whether that option is worthwhile depends on its price and the benefits that it provides.
Or consider the case of marriage and suppose that because of law or social norms, it is difficult to
divorce, so that a decision to marry cannot readily be reversed. If so, prospective spouses might be
willing to do a great deal to maintain their flexibility before marrying—far more than they would be
willing to do if divorce were much easier.
It should be readily apparent how an understanding of option value might explain the emphasis,
in the NEPA and other statutes involving public health and the environment, on irreversible losses.
The central point of NEPA is to ensure that government officials give serious consideration to envi-
ronmental factors before they take action that might threaten the environment.32 If the government is
building a road through a pristine area, drilling in Alaska, or licensing a nuclear power plant, it must
produce an ‘environmental impact statement’ discussing the environmental effects. The produc-
tion of these statements can be burdensome and costly. But when potentially irreversible losses are
involved, and when officials cannot specify the magnitude or likelihood of such losses, the public,
and those involved in making the ultimate decision, ought to know about them.
So too in the domain of public health. If a risk—of, e.g. avian flu—is highly speculative, we
might nonetheless take precautions in order to preserve flexibility for the future. The special concern
about overuse of antibiotics, in increasing resistance, involves the same goal. And when officials
undertake precautions against low-probability risks, an intuitive concern about irreversibility is often
the animating concern.
29 Ibid at 582.
30 Copeland and Antikarocov, supra, at 13.
31 See generally, Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).
32 Bradley Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s Environmental Performance,
102 Columbia Law Rev. 903 (2002).
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 IRREVERSIBILITY 233
2.2 Options, imperfect knowledge and precautions
It should now be clear that the idea of option value might help support an Irreversible Harm Precau-
tionary Principle. The most influential essay, by Kenneth Arrow and Anthony Fisher, demonstrates
that the ideas of uncertainty and irreversibility have considerable importance to many domains.33
Arrow and Fisher imagine that the question is whether to preserve a virgin redwood forest for wilder-
ness recreation or instead to open it to clear-cut logging. Assume that if the development option is
chosen, the destruction of the forest is effectively irreversible. Arrow and Fisher argue that it matters
whether the authorities cannot yet assess the costs or benefits of a proposed development. If devel-
opment produces ‘some irreversible transformation of the environment, hence a loss in perpetuity
of the benefits from preservation’, then it is worth paying something to wait to acquire the miss-
ing information. Their suggestion is that ‘the expected benefits of an irreversible decision should be
adjusted to reflect the loss of options it entails’.34
Fisher generalizes this argument to suggest that ‘[w]here a decision problem is characterized by
(1)uncertaintyaboutfuturecostsandbenefitsofthealternatives,(2)prospectsforresolvingorreduc-
ing the uncertainty with the passage of time, and (3) irreversibility of one or more of the alternatives,
an extra value, an option value, properly attaches to the reversible alternative(s)’.35 The intuition
here is both straightforward and appealing: more steps should be taken to prevent harms that are
effectively final than to prevent those that can be reversed at some cost. If an irreversible harm is on
one side and a reversible one on the other, and if decision-makers are uncertain36 about future costs
and benefits of precautions, an understanding of option value suggests that it is worthwhile to spend
a certain amount to preserve future flexibility by paying a premium to avoid the irreversible harm.
Judge Richard Posner has invoked a point of this sort as a justification for aggressive steps to
combat climate change.37 Posner acknowledges that the size of the threat of climate change is dis-
puted, and hence, it is tempting to wait to regulate, or to wait to regulate aggressively, until we have
more information. But there is a serious problem with waiting, which is ‘the practically irreversible
effect of greenhouse gas emissions on the atmospheric concentration of those gases’.38 Thus, Pos-
ner reasons that ‘[m]aking shallower cuts now can be thought of as purchasing an option to enable
global warming to be stopped or slowed at some future time at a lower cost’.39 The reduction in cost,
as a result of current steps, could result from lowering current emissions or simply from increasing
the rate of technological innovations that make pollution reduction less costly in the future. Posner
concludes that the option approach makes sense for other catastrophic risks as well, including those
33 See Kenneth Arrow and Anthony Fischer, Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty and Irreversibility, 88 Q. J. Econo.
312, 313–314 (1974).
34 Ibid at 319.
35 See Anthony C. Fisher, Uncertainty, Irreversibility, and the Timing of Climate Policy 9 (2001), available at
http://are.berkeley.edu/courses/IAS175/Spring2006/pdfs/Fisher.pdf.
36 I use the word ‘uncertain’ to refer to both risk and uncertainty. ‘Risk’ exists when it is possible to assign probabilities to
various outcomes; ‘uncertainty’ exists when no probabilities can be assigned. For the seminal discussion, which has prompted
a heated debate, see Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933). For a non-
technical overview, see Jon Elster, Explaining Technical Change 185–207 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
37 See Richard A. Posner, Catastrophe 161–162 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004). A more technical discussion
to the same effect is contained in Graciela Chichilnisky and Geoffrey Heal, Global Environmental Risks, 7 J. Econ. Persp.
65, 76 (1993), emphasizing the need for a distinctive approach to ‘risks that are poorly understood, endogenous, collective,
and irreversible’. Ibid at 67. For a more detailed treatment of option value and irreversibility, see ibid at 76–84.
38 Posner, supra note, at 161–162.
39 Ibid at 162.
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 234 C. R. SUNSTEIN
associated with genetically modified crops. Recall the possibility that overuse of antibiotics can in-
crease resistance in a way that also eliminates a kind of option value.
The general point here is that, as in the stock market, those involved in promoting public health
and environmental protection are trying to project a stream of good and bad effects over time; the
ability to project the stream of effects will improve and hence much can be gained from being able
to make the decision later in time rather than earlier. If better decisions can be made in the future,
then there is a value to putting the decision off to a later date. The key point is that uncertainty and
irreversibility should lead to a sequential decision-making process. If better information will emerge,
regulators might seek an approach that preserves greater flexibility, at least if that approach is not
too costly. The extent of the appropriate ‘irreversibility premium’ depends on the details.
3. Seriousness and sunk costs
Even under this account, the idea of irreversibility is not without ambiguity. Let us consider two
possible interpretations. Under the first, an effect is irreversible when restoration to the status quo is
impossible or at best extremely difficult, at least on a relevant timescale. For example, the ‘decision
not to preserve a rich reservoir of biodiversity such as the 60 million-year-old Korup forest in Nigeria
is irreversible. The alteration or destruction of a unique asset of this type has an awesome finality’.40
If this is the appropriate interpretation of irreversibility, then it is an aspect of seriousness. A second
interpretation, standard in the economic literature on options, sees irreversibility in terms of sunk
costs. The two interpretations lead to different understandings of the problem of irreversibility and
the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle.
3.1 Irreversibility and seriousness
Under the first interpretation, the initial question is whether a clear line separates the reversible from
the irreversible.41 Perhaps we have a continuum, not a dichotomy. The question is not whether some
effectcanbereversed,butinsteadatwhatcost.Areasthathavebeendeveloped,orotherwiseharmed,
can often be returned to their original state, even if at considerable expense. Even lost forests can be
restored. If a public health problem causes illness but not death, then people can ultimately be saved.
But sometimes the cost is high, even prohibitive, and sometimes restoration is literally impossible.
If air pollution would kill 200 people a year, or if climate change would produce tens of thousands
of death in India, those losses cannot be recovered. Even biological changes in the human body
may not be reversible (whether or not they are associated with immediate or long-term harm). Some
kinds of air pollution induce changes that endure for decades. In all these cases, irreversibility is
simply an aspect of seriousness. If 200 people will die from certain levels of pollution, the harm is
more serious than if 200 people would merely get sick. If air pollution induces biological changes,
everything depends on the magnitude of the harm associated with those changes.
At first glance, these points underline the mundane point that permanent or long-term harms
are more serious than short-term ones under a standard framework, suggesting that the extent of
appropriate precautions depends on the size of the harms and the cost and burden associated with
preventing or (if possible) reversing them. If social problem cannot be reversed at all, we should take
40 See Graciela Chichilnisky and Geoffrey Heal, Global Environmental Risks, 7 J. Econ. Persp. 65, 76 (1993).
41 For a useful treatment, see Neil A. Manson, The Concept of Irreversibility: Its Use in the Sustainable Development and
Precautionary Principle Literatures, 1 Electronic J. Sustain. Dev. 1 (2007).
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more aggressive precautions than we would if it can be reversed only at great expense, monetary or
otherwise—and if it can be reversed only at great expense, we would take more precautions than we
would if it would be easy to reverse it.
But there is a larger conceptual point here, which is that whether a change is reversible depends
on exactly how it is characterized. If an act A occurs at time t1, no subsequent event can alter the
fact that A occurred at 11; the past cannot be altered or reversed. Any death, of any living creature,
is irreversible, and what is true for living creatures is true for rocks and refrigerators too; if these
are destroyed, they are destroyed forever. And because of the flow of time, every decision is, in an
intelligible sense, irreversible. If a couple goes on vacation in Greece in July of a certain year, that
decision cannot be reversed, and what else might have been done at that time will have been perma-
nently lost. Even if divorce is easy, a marriage is irreversible in the sense that people will have been
married for the relevant period. If government builds a new highway in upstate New York in May,
that particular decision will be irreversible; nothing else will be done with that land in May, even
though the highway can be later replaced or eliminated. This is the sense in which ‘irreversibility’
depends on how the underlying act is characterized. If we characterize it narrowly, to be and to do
precisely what it is and does in terms of time and place, any act is irreversible by definition.
Environmentalists who are concerned about irreversibility have something more particular in
mind. They mean something like a large-scale alteration in environmental conditions—one that im-
poses permanent, or nearly permanent, changes in those conditions. Any such alteration might justify
significant concern, but it should be clear that irreversibility in this sense is not a sufficient reason
for a highly precautionary approach. At a minimum, the irreversible change has to be for the worse,
and it must also rise to a certain level. A truly miniscule change in the global temperature, even if
permanent, would not justify expensive precautions if it is benign or if it imposes little in the way of
harm. For this reason, it is tempting to understand the idea of irreversibility as inseparable from that
of seriousness. A loss of a wisdom tooth is irreversible, but not a reason for particular precautions
on behalf of wisdom teeth; a loss of an extremely small forest, with no wildlife, hardly justifies a
special principle, even if that loss cannot be reversed. A loss of a large forest, with ample wildlife,
is a different matter.
At first glance, then, irreversibility matters only because of its connection with the magnitude of
the harm; irreversibility operates as a kind of amplifier. In law, a comparison might be made with
the idea that courts will refuse to issue a preliminary injunction unless the plaintiff can show that
there is a likelihood of an ‘irreparable harm’ if the injunction is not granted.42 Irreparability is not
a sufficient condition for granting the injunction; the harm must be serious as well as irreparable.
And if irreversibility is to be analysed in the same way, then an Irreversible Harm Precautionary
Principle is really part of a Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle,43 or at least a Significant
Harm Precautionary Principle.
If so, the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle is important and should be taken into
account; but it is not especially distinctive. The principle is also vulnerable, some of the time, to
the same objections that apply to the precautionary principle as a whole.44 As we shall shortly see,
42 On this idea in the environmental context, see Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F2d 497 (1st Cir 1989); Comment, Injunctions
for NEPA Violations: Balancing the Equities, 59 U Chi L Rev 1263 (1992).
43 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle, Issues in Legal Scholarship, Catastrophic Risks:
Prevention, Compensation, and Recovery (2007): Article 3, available at  http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss10/art3.
44 See Sunstein, supra note.
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significant and even irreversible harms may well be on all sides of risk-related problems, and a focus
on one set of risks will give rise to others.
3.2 Lost amenities, sunk costs and imperfect knowledge
Analysts of irreversibility and options understand the idea of irreversibility in a different and techni-
calway.45 Irreversibleinvestmentsaresunkcosts—thosethatcannotberecovered.Examplesinclude
expenditures on advertising and marketing, or even capital investments designed to improve the per-
formance of a factory. In fact the purchase of motor vehicles, computers and office equipment is not
fully reversible because the purchase cost is usually significantly higher than resale value. Exam-
ples of reversible investments include the opening of bank accounts and the purchase of bonds. The
problem with an investment that is irreversible is that those who make it relinquish ‘the possibility
of waiting for new information that might affect the desirability or timing of the expenditure, and
this lost option value is an opportunity cost that must be included as part of the investment’.46 This,
in short, is the economic conception of irreversibility that I mean to emphasize here.
Many people agree that we should characterize, as irreversible harms, adverse public health or
environmental effects that are both serious and extremely expensive and time consuming to reverse.
This is the understanding that leads Posner and others to argue for the purchase of an ‘option’ to slow
down climate change at a lower rate in the future. Immediate adoption of a policy produces a ‘sunk
benefit’. The argument is correct and important, but it neglects an important point: ‘Irreversibility, in
the relevant sense, might well lie on all sides.’ Regulation that reduces one (irreversible) risk might
well increase another such risk. Efforts to reduce climate change and other dangers associated with
fossil fuel use, e.g. may lead to increased dependence on nuclear energy, which threatens to produce
irreversible harms of its own; in China, nuclear energy has been actively defended as a way of
combating climate change.47 As with the precautionary principle, in general, so with the Irreversible
Harm Precautionary Principle in particular: Measures that the principle requires, on grounds on
safety and health, might well be prohibited on exactly those grounds.48 And there is a more general
point. If steps are taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, capital costs will be incurred, and they
cannot be recouped. Sunk costs are a familiar feature of regulation in the form of mandates that
require technological change. We are often dealing, then, with irreversibilities, not irreversibility.
For many public health and environmental problems, this point severely complicates the appli-
cation of the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle. As Fisher writes for climate change, in the
abstract ‘it is not clear whether the conditions of the problem imply that investment in control ought
to be slowed or reduced, while waiting for information needed to make a better decision, or that
45 See Avinash Dixit and Robert Pindyck, Investment under Uncertainty 6 (1994) (‘When a firm makes an irreversible
investment expenditure, it exercises, or “kills,” its option to invest. It gives up the possibility of waiting for new information
to arrive that might affect the desirability or timing of the expenditure, and this lost option value is an opportunity cost that
must be included as part of the investment’.).
46 Ibid at 6.
47 See, e.g. Ling Zhong, Note, Nuclear Energy: China’s Approach Towards Addressing Global Warming, 12 Georgetown
Int. Environ. Law Rev. 493 (2000). It is of course possible to urge nations to reduce their reliance on coal or nuclear power
and move instead towards alternatives that would be preferable on risk-related grounds, such as solar power. For a general
discussion, see Renewable Energy: Power for a Sustainable Future (Godfrey Boyle ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996); Allan Collinson, Renewable Energy: Facing the Future (London: Cloverleaf, 1991); Dr. Dan E. Arvizu, Advanced
Energy Technology and Climate Change Policy, 2 Fla. Coast. Law J. 435 (2001). But these alternatives pose problems of
their own, involving feasibility and expense. See, e.g. Lomborg, supra note, at 118–148.
48 See Sunstein, supra note.
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investment should come sooner to preserve the option to protect ourselves from impacts that may
be revealed in the future as serious or even catastrophic’.49 It is for this reason that some observers
have concluded, unlike Posner, that the existence of uncertainty and irreversibility argue for less,
not more, in a way of investments in reducing greenhouse gas emissions.50 Those investments may
themselves turn out to be irreversible. For some public health problems, significant expenditures are
sunk costs, and they may be substantial. Everything depends on the likelihood and magnitude of the
losses on all sides.
Nothingsaidheresupportstheimplausibleviewthattherightapproachtoemergingpublichealth
problems is adequately captured in the idea of ‘wait and learn’. That approach makes sense only if
we lose very little when we defer investments while waiting to obtain more information about the
benefits. But if a great deal is likely to be lost by deferring such investments, then the judgement
shouldbereversed.Thereisgoodreasontobelievethattheirreversiblelossesassociatedwithclimate
change do indeed justify the irreversible losses associated with greater investments in emissions
reductions, worldwide. My conclusion is that if irreversibility is defined in economic terms, pointing
to the value of preserving flexibility for an uncertain future, it provides a distinctive and plausible
understanding of the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle.
4. Irreversibility and incommensurability
The economic conception of irreversibility misses something important. When people say that the
loss of a pristine area or of a species is irreversible, they do not merely mean that the loss is grave
and that it takes a great deal to provide adequate compensation. They mean that what is lost is
incommensurable—that it is qualitatively distinctive, and that when we lose it, we may lose some-
thing that is unique.51
The central claims here are that human goods are diverse and that we do violence to our con-
sidered judgements about them when we line them up along a single metric.52 Suppose, e.g. that a
species of tigers or elephants is lost. The nature of the concern about lost species is not adequately
captured in the idea of ‘option value’. The species is not its economic equivalent. People do not value
an endangered species in the same way that they value money; it is not as if a species, a beach, a
friendship or a child is indistinguishable from specified monetary sums. If we see species, beaches,
friendships and children as equivalent to one another, or as equal to some amount of money, we
will have on odd and even unrecognizable understanding of all these goods. When people object to
the loss of a species or a beach, and contend that the loss is irreversible, they mean to point to its
permanence and to the fact that what has been lost is not valued in the same way or along the same
metric as money. Return to the issue of climate change and note that on some estimates, a significant
percentage of the world’s species will be lost as a result of warmer temperatures.53 On one view,
what makes this loss ‘irreversible’ is that something qualitatively unique, without real substitutes,
will be gone permanently.
49 Fisher, supra note, at 11.
50 See note supra.
51 See Martha N. Nussbaum, Plato on Commensurability and Desire, in Love’s Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1994).
52 Good discussions can be found in ibid; Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1993); Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).
53 See Hsiung and Sunstein, supra note.
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To be sure, a good can have incommensurable value even if its loss does not raise concerns about
irreversibility. Recall the case of a photo album whose loss initially seems unique, but suppose that
the negatives exist, and so the album can be recreated even if it is destroyed. In that event, the loss
would not be irreversible in any interesting sense—but it remains the case that the value of the album
is incommensurable with money. We could imagine cases in which amenities have incommensurable
value, but in which their loss is not truly irreversible. It follows that incommensurability is not
a sufficient condition for irreversibility. But when many goods are lost and cannot be recovered,
the special problem is that they are qualitatively distinctive or in an important respect unique; that
judgement underlies the desire to preserve them.
This claim—a challenge to prominent understandings of utilitarian and economic conceptions
of value54—should not be confused. Of course, people are willing to make trade-offs among qual-
itatively diverse goods, and they do so all the time. We will pay a certain amount, and no more, to
be able to protect members or an endangered species or to visit the beach or to help preserve it in
a pristine state; public health problems threaten to cause losses of unique goods, including human
lives, but tradeoffs are nonetheless made; we will not pay an infinite sum to see our friends or even
to maintain our friendships; we will take some precautions, but not others, to reduce environmental
riskstoourselvesandtoourchildren.Tosaythatagoodisnotfungibleisnottosaythatitisinfinitely
valuable. To say that a good lacks substitutes is not to deny that people will give up some amount,
and not more, to preserve incommensurability can exist alongside tradeoffs. The point is only that
when a loss is deemed irreversible, it is because the good in question is not believed to be fungible
with other human goods. Many of those who are concerned about irreversible harms intend to stress
this point. What is gained by an understanding of incommensurability is a more vivid appreciation
of why certain losses cannot be dismissed as mere ‘costs’.
These points are closely connected with important claims in environmental ethics.55 On one
view, ‘not everything is substitutable for everything else through the medium of utility. And a corol-
lary of that fact is the further fact that some things are irreplaceable’.56 A wild and scenic river, e.g.
might be valued because of its origins and history; a restoration of that river, as, e.g. through an
artificial watercourse, would not provide an adequate substitute.57 Foundations for this view might
be found in a claim that natural processes have some kind of intrinsic value simply because they are
natural.58 If that idea seems implausible or contentious, at least we might be able to agree that certain
decisions would produce losses that are in a moral sense irreversible even if that claim seems mys-
terious from the standpoint of economic theory. To the extent that it neglects this point, economic
theory is obtuse, in the sense that it will be unable to appreciate powerful concerns that animate many
debates in law, politics and ethics. This is not to say that an understanding of incommensurability
points to any particular shift in cost–benefit analysis (though it helps to explain why the properly
monetized benefits of species loss, or loss of pristine areas, may be very high). But it is to say that
an effort to line up all relevant goods on a single metric will make it difficult to understand what is
at stake in the domains and politics of law.
54 See Nussbaum, supra note.
55 For an illuminating discussion, see Robert Goodin, Green Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992).
56 Ibid at 60.
57 Ibid at 41.
58 Ibid.
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It follows that an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle, used in private decisions or demo-
cratic arenas, might be implemented with a recognition of the qualitative distinctness and perhaps
uniqueness of many social losses—especially when those losses affect future generations. Here too,
however, it is important to see that precautionary steps may themselves impose incommensurable
losses, not merely monetary ones. Recall, e.g. that environmental protection of one sort may create
environmental problems of another sort. The same is true for measures designed to protect public
health more generally. To the extent that concern with overuse of antibiotics leads to less use of an-
tibiotics, serious health harms may be threatened; here, as elsewhere, we are dealing with risk–risk
tradeoffs. And if the diverse nature of social goods is to play a part in the implementations of an
Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle, it must attend to the fact that diverse goods may be on all
sides. Here too, there is no escaping at least implicit assignment of monetary values to those goods.
To say that a social loss is not commensurate with money, in a moral sense, is not to say that human
beings can avoid some form of monetization. The point is that in the domains of private choice and
democratic judgement, any monetary assignment should be undertaken with an understanding of the
nature of the goods at stake. As I have emphasized, this point does not provide any guidance for
resolving the important issue of how the assignment of monetary value should occur. But for those
concerned about irreversibility in the relevant sense, that is not the only issue. We need to consider
‘how” goods are valued, not merely ‘how much’ goods are valued.
For an especially controversial application, consider biological enhancements of human beings.
Of course, some people fear unanticipated adverse effects on human health. But others believe that if
we undertake some such enhancements, we will, in effect, alter human nature or our understanding
of it, and it will not be possible to turn back.59 On one view, these alterations will create a qual-
itatively distinctive harm to our understandings about the nature of persons, and once the loss has
been experienced, it will not be reversible. For most imaginable enhancements, including those that
would greatly improve current human capacities, I do not share this concern. Existing capacities
do not have any special moral claims, and improvements on them do not threaten distinctive losses
worthy of concern (or so it seems to me). But it is difficult to understand current debates without
acknowledging that this objection lies at their heart.
5. Environmental injunctions
In American law, an understanding of these points helps to explain some longstanding disputes
about the issuance of preliminary injunctions in environmental cases. I investigate this somewhat
narrow and technical problem here, with the hope that it will illuminate a number of questions about
precautions in the face of irreversibility.
For many years, some courts of appeals had held that when environmental harm was alleged,
district courts should adopt a presumption of irreparable damage and indeed a presumption in favour
ofinjunctiverelief.60 Onawidespreadview,environmentalharmsarepresumedtobeirreparableand
to provide an appropriate occasion for such relief.61 In NEPA cases, the result was a likely injunction
if the agency had failed to prepare an adequate environmental impact statement: ‘Irreparable damage
59 For one version of this argument, see Michael Sandel, The Case Against Perfection (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2007).
60 See Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F2d 754, 764 (9th Cir 1985).
61 This view is sketched and rejected in Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 US 531 (1987) .
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is presumed when an agency fails to evaluate thoroughly the environmental impact of a proposed
action’.62 Apparently, the idea is that if no environmental impact statement is provided, or if any
such statement is inadequate, the risk to the environment is presumed to be irreparable, perhaps in
the sense of irreversible. But what is the basis for this presumption? And what follows from it? Does
it follow that injunctions will issue in any case in which a private or public institution has failed to
comply, even as a technical matter, with federal environmental law? Does it follow, e.g. that the U.S.
Navy must be enjoined from conducting weapons-training operations before it has obtained a permit
to discharge ordnance into the sea?
In response to the last question, the Supreme Court offered a negative answer.63 Rejecting the
idea that environmental violations should give rise to automatic injunctions, the Court said that an
injunction is an equitable remedy, subject to traditional balancing, and that it would ‘not lightly as-
sume that Congress has intended to depart from established principles’ permitting district courts to
exercise their discretion.64 In a subsequent case, involving the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,
the Court underlined the point and expressly rejected the presumption of irreparable harm in envi-
ronmental cases.65 ‘This presumption is contrary to traditional equitable principles’.66 Nonetheless,
the Court stressed environmental problems raise distinct issues because ‘[e]nvironmental injury, by
its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is often permanent or at least
of long duration, i.e., irreparable’.67 Notably, the Court did not explain what it meant by the intrigu-
ing claim that environmental injuries ‘can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages’. But
the Court said that if an environmental injury is likely, ‘the balance of harms will usually favor the
issuance of an injunction to protect the environment’. 68
When courts of appeals spoke in terms of a presumption in favour of injunctive relief, they might
beunderstoodasadoptingaversionoftheIrreversibleHarmPrecautionaryPrinciple—assumingthat
environmental harm is irreversible in the relevant sense, and requiring a strong showing by those who
seek to proceed in the face of that harm. This interpretation helps to explain the simplest exception
to the lower courts’ presumption: cases in which ‘irreparable harm to the environment would result
if such relief were granted’.69 If, e.g. an injunction against the use of a logging road would prevent
the removal of diseased trees and hence allow the spread of infect infection through national forests,
no injunction would issue.70
Here, then, is a clear recognition of the existence of environment–environment tradeoffs in a
way that requires a qualification of any Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle. And when the
Supreme Court rejected the presumption, it did so in favour of traditional equitable balancing in a
way that recognized that serious harms, and perhaps irreversible harms, are on all sides. But even
in doing so, the Court endorsed a kin of Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle through its (too-
simple) suggestion that environmental injury ‘is often permanent or at least of long duration’ and
62 Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F2d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir 1984). For general discussion, see Zigmund Plater, Statutory
Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 Cal L Rev 524 (1982).
63 See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 US 305 (1982).
64 Ibid at 313.
65 Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 US 531 (1987).
66 Ibid at 544.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 People of Village of Gambell v. Hodel, 774 F2d 1414, 1424 (9th Cir 1985) (emphasis in original).
70 Alpine Lakes Protection Society v. Schlapfer, 518 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir 1975); Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d at 764, n. 8.
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its statement that harms to the environment can seldom be adequately remedied by money dam-
ages. Indeed, the latter statement seems to be an implicit recognition of the incommensurability
problem.
What remains undecided, after the Court’s decisions in the 1980s, is the appropriate judicial
posture in the face of violations of NEPA.71 The Court’s rejection of a presumption in favour of
preliminary injunctions might well be taken to suggest that such injunctions ought rarely to issue in
NEPA cases72—especially, perhaps, in light of the fact that NEPA is a purely procedural statute, one
that imposes information-gathering duties on agencies without requiring them to take that informa-
tion into account.73 If courts cannot forbid agencies to act as they choose after producing an adequate
environmental impact statement, injunctions might seem an odd remedy in the NEPA setting. But
in what remains the most elaborate discussion of the question, then Circuit Judge Breyer suggested
that injunctions are often appropriate in NEPA cases.74 The discussion endorses an appropriately
constrained Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle, adapted to the NEPA setting, and resting on
some combination of the accounts of irreversibility offered here.75
Judge Breyer did not contend that a presumption in favour of injunctive relief would be appropri-
ate for environmental cases in general. Instead, he argued that NEPA is meant to prevent a particular
kind of injury, one that should play a central role in the decision whether to grant an injunction. The
purpose of NEPA is to ensure that officials take environmental considerations into account before
they embark on a course of action. ‘Thus, when a decision to which NEPA obligations attach is made
without the informed environmental consideration that NEPA requires, the harm that NEPA intends
to prevent has been suffered’.76 That harm is not adequately described as a harm to the environment
as such.77 The harm is instead the increased risk of harm to the environment that arises ‘when gov-
ernmental decisionmakers make up their minds without having before them an analysis (with prior
public comment) of the likely effects of their decision upon the environment’.78
Irreversibility is central here, for it is simply the case that administrators are less likely to destroy
a nearly completed project than one that has only started. The relevant harm ‘may well have to do
with the psychology of decisionmakers, and perhaps a more deeply rooted psychological instinct not
to tear down projects once they are built’.79 The problem is that ‘real environmental harm will occur
through inadequate foresight and deliberation’.80 Judge Breyer’s point, then, is that ‘the district
court should take account of the potentially irreparable nature of this decisionmaking risk to the
environment when considering a request for preliminary injunction’.81
71 For general discussion, see Comment, Injunctions for NEPA Violations: Balancing the Equities, 59 U Chi L Rev. 1263
(1992).
72 See New York v. NRC, 550 F2d 745 (2nd Cir 1977); Conservation Society v. Secretary of Transportation, 508 F.2d 927,
933-3 (2nd Cir 1974); United States v. 27.09 Acres of Land, 737 F Supp 277, 283-84 (SDNY 1990); Stand Together Against
Neighborhood Decay v. Board of Estimate, 690 F Supp 1191 (EDNY 1988).
73 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 US 332 (1989).
74 Sierra Club v Marsh, 872 F2d 497 (1st Cir 1989).
75 See, in this vein, Washington County, North Carolina v. US Department of the Navy, 317 F Supp 2d 626 (EDNC 2004);
Crutchfield v. US Army Corp of Engineers, 192 F.Supp. 2d 444 (ED Va 2001).
76 Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F2d at 500.
77 Ibid at 504.
78 Ibid at 500.
79 Ibid at 504.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid at 501.
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We can understand this analysis in one of two ways, corresponding to the two conceptions of
irreversible environmental harm. The first involves the distinctive value of (some) environmental
amenities and the risk that once they are lost, they are lost forever. The context in which Judge
Breyer wrote, involving a pristine area, helps to clarify what may be at stake. The second involves
imperfect information and option value. One goal of NEPA is to acquire environmental information
atanearlystageinordertoensurethatofficialsdonotcompromisefutureflexibilitybyembarkingon
courses of action that acquire unstoppable momentum. Injunctions, in the face of NEPA violations,
freeze the status quo in a way that promotes that flexibility.
None of this means that in NEPA cases, preliminary injunctions should issue as a matter of
course; that view would endorse the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle in its crudest form.
Sometimes injunctions will themselves impose serious harm, and sometimes the risk to the environ-
ment is trivial.82 But in NEPA cases, it makes sense to consider, as a relevant factor, the risk that an
inadequately informed decision to proceed will alter the status quo, ensuring that once an environ-
mental impact statement is produced, it will be too late to have a meaningful effect on the outcome.
If delay is not exceedingly costly, and if the risk of environmental harm is serious, injunctive relief
is appropriate for NEPA violations.
An understanding of the risk of irreversibility helps to explain why. And that understanding has
broader implications, extending to many issues involving public health. If the question is whether
to impose bans and restrictions immediately, or instead to ‘wait and learn’, the two conceptions of
irreversibility greatly matter.
6. Qualifications and conclusions
The foundations of an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle, along with an understanding of its
limitations, are now in place. We lack any kind of algorithm for implementing that principle. But we
should be able to that when a harm is irreversible in the sense that it is very costly or impossible to
make restoration, special precautions may be justified; that it often makes sense to ‘buy’ an option to
preserve future flexibility; and that the loss of cherished and qualitatively distinctive goods deserves
particular attention. But there are three important qualifications, involving the idea of optimal delay,
distributional considerations and what I shall call precommitment value. Let us briefly explore each
of these.
6.1 Irreversibilities and optimal delay
The general notion of optimal delay provides important countervailing considerations. Future gener-
ations will almost certainly be both wealthier and more knowledgeable than the current generation.
At least if wealth helps, they will be in a far better position, and possibly an unimaginably better
position, to handle public health and environmental problems that materialize in their time.83 Ac-
cording to the Thomas Schelling, the nearly inevitable increase in wealth over time means that it
‘makes no sense to make current generations “pay” for the problems of future generations’.84 Why
should the relatively poor present transfer its limited resources to benefit the future, which is likely to
82 See Village of Gambell, supra note.
83 See Remarks of Vernon L. Smith in Global Crises, Global Solutions 630, 635 (Bjorn Lomborg ed.) (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004).
84 Remarks of Thomas C. Schelling in Global Crises, Global Solutions, supra note, at 627.
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be relatively rich? There is another problem. Expensive investments in precautions—such as green-
house gas reduction—may turn out to diminish available resources for future generations, leaving
them with less to use to control the damage that actually occurs.85
The argument for ‘wait and learn’ is strengthened by these points. But any such argument must
also take account of the incontrovertible fact that waiting simultaneously threatens to diminish the
flexibility of future decision makers and perhaps severely.86 Compare the loss of endangered species;
becausethelossispermanent,wehavetobecarefulaboutdelayingprecautionarymeasuresdesigned
to ensure their continued existence.
6.2 Irreversibilities, distribution and the least well-off
At first glance, an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle might seem to be especially beneficial
to disadvantaged people.87 In the context of climate change, aggressive precautions are projected
to give far more to poor countries than to rich ones, partly because rich nations are so much less
dependent on agriculture.88 Nonetheless, there is no simple connection between distributional goals
and an emphasis on irreversible harms. Some of the risks associated with genetic engineering are
irreversible, but the benefits of genetic engineering are likely to be felt most in poor nations. In the
context of climate change, poor countries, including India and China, cannot easily afford aggressive
regulation; they might be better off if they are allowed to continue to emit greenhouse gases. The
point applies to many environmental and public health problems.
In short, the analysis of distributional goals must be undertaken separately from the analysis of
irreversibility. Sometimes we will hurt the least well-off, rather than help them, if we buy an option
to preserve our own flexibility. The cost of the option might be paid mostly by those who can least
afford it.
6.3 Precommitment value
I have emphasized the value of preserving flexibility. But in some domains, future flexibility is
undesirable, and individual and societies are willing to pay a great deal to eliminate it. The tale
of Ulysses and the Sirens is perhaps the most familiar example,89 and the idea of precommitment
has many applications. A constitution can itself be seen as a precommitment device by which we
relinquish our flexibility in order to be governed by firm rules. With respect to terrorism, we might do
best if we commit ourselves to taking certain courses of action if we are attacked; the precommitment
creates deterrence.
In the public health context, regulators might be willing to pay for precommitment strategies that
will operate as a constraint on any number of problems. These include interest-group power, myopia,
weakness of will and cognitive biases. A single decision maker who is a social maximizer might
85 Remarks of Vernon L. Smith, supra note, at 635.
86 See, e.g. Cline, supra note, at 56, 57. Cline emphasizes that both the slowness of political processes and the gradual
nature of climate change make it nearly impossible to make such changes ‘on a dime’. Ibid.
87 See generally, Juan Almendares, Science, Human Rights, and the Precautionary Principle in Honduras in Precaution,
Environmental Science, and Preventive Public Policy 55 (Joel A. Tickner ed.) (Washington, DC: Island, 2003) (discussing
advantages to Third World countries offered by the precautionary principle).
88 See Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 Georgetown Law J. 1775 (2008).
89 See, e.g. Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, rev. ed. 1986).
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favour a precommitment strategy. In the context of precautions against contagious diseases, such a
decision maker might argue for an approach that diminishes flexibility—believing that weakness of
will or unavailability bias (a form of cognitive error), might lead people to excessive emissions of
greenhouse gas unless they adopt such an approach. Alternatively, a precommitment strategy might
be adopted on the theory that interest-group pressures will defeat alternative approaches. Indeed,
the conventional precautionary principle, understood to place a thumb on the scales in favour of
public health and the environment, might be explained in these terms.90 Perhaps the principle can be
understood not as an effort to preserve flexibility, which can be bad, but on the contrary as an effort
to ensure a commitment to a course of action that will provide the right level of protection.
The difficulty, for any such explanation, should now be familiar: any precommitment strategy
may give rise to problems, including public health and environmental problems, for which a pre-
commitment strategy might also be justified. It is nonetheless important to see that option value is
sometimes paralleled by ‘precommitment value’ for which regulators might be willing to spend a
great deal.
7. Conclusions
The concept of irreversibility might be taken to refer to the sheer gravity of certain losses, and ideas
about both permanence and magnitude play a large role in moral intuitions, including those that
play a significant role in law. I have suggested, however, that the concept is best understood in two
distinctive ways. On one account, the concern about irreversibility refers to people’s willingness to
pay a premium to maintain flexibility for the future. In many settings, it makes sense to pay for an
option to avoid a risk of losses that are irreversible in the sense that they cannot be recouped. The
amount of the payment depends on the size and nature of the loss if it is irreversible. If irreversible
losses are on both sides, then it is necessary to assess their likelihood and their magnitude. We can
find an implicit understanding of option value in the emphasis on irreversibility in American law,
along with many international agreements. But because social expenditures are typically sunk costs,
an emphasis on irreversibility will sometimes argue in favour of delaying, rather than accelerating
expensive forms of protection. Whether it does so depends on what is known about the magnitude
and likelihood of the relevant effects. It is necessary to assess both these in order to know how to
proceed.
On an alternative view, the idea of irreversibility points to the qualitative distinctness and some-
times uniqueness of certain social goods, and the implausibility of suggesting that those goods are
fungible with money. Of course, few goods are infinitely valuable. But it is obtuse to think that public
health, wildlife or pristine areas are valued in the same way as their cash equivalents. Anyone who
believed in such equivalence would have an unrecognizable understanding of how health, wildlife
and pristine areas are properly appreciated and experienced. This understanding of irreversibility is
difficult to operationalize; it does not suggest any particular specification of an Irreversible Harm
Precautionary Principle. But it does, I suggest, help to illuminate important areas of law, including
the courts’ relative willingness to issue injunctions in environmental cases. That willingness helps
to explain the view that in many domains, it is appropriate to act aggressively and immediately,
notwithstanding the speculative and merely probabilistic character of the relevant harms.
90 See David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1315 (2003).
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